Adaptive Sensor Management

Navy aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare (L-class) ships are defended by the SSDS, a combat system comprised of weapons, sensors, communications systems, computers, and other elements working together to detect, track, and engage inbound anti-ship missiles and other threats. SSDS platforms sense their environments and identify tracks of interest by integrating inputs from a variety of sensors, which include rotating, fixed face and fire control or target illumination radars that cover a variety of radar bands, as well as electronic support (ES) sensors that process received Radio Frequency (RF) waveforms. Each of these sensors provides its update to the combat system at different rates. For example, while phased array radars can provide rapid target measurements and schedule beams or dwells across a wide field of view, rotating radars may have much narrower fields of view (FOVs) and provide full rotations only once every several seconds. However, because each sensor strives to maximize performance and provide the information necessary for SSDS to build and maintain fire control quality tracks on targets of interest, there are conditions in which further aggregation of sensor data may provide diminishing returns related to fire control track quality (e.g., continuing to provide updates on certain well-characterized tracks may not offer significant track state covariance reductions or additional fire control quality improvements over its current state). It may be advantageous in these cases to shift some of those sensor tasks to other combat system needs, specifically where those additional tasks could substantially improve track quality on other targets or help improve situation awareness via other means. Nothing available commercially can provide this capability. The Navy seeks an algorithm-based software solution that automatically detects which sensors are contributing to fire control quality tracks on particular targets, assesses the relative magnitudes of their contributions, identifies conditions in which particular sensor resources could be released for other sensor tasking, and specifies which current or potentially novel sensor tasking would benefit most from allocation of those released resources. Proposed solutions should be dynamic, adaptive, responsive to rapid changes in track hostility characterization (i.e., solvable in real-time or better, minimizing algorithmic worst-case time complexity), and work with heterogeneous combinations of sensor tasking and resource utilization feedback parameters. Solutions must identify each sensor’s capability that is controllable by SSDS (e.g., search sectors, search modes, track-based controls, and cueing capabilities, among others) and leverage those realistic features in a solution for SSDS. Examples of alternative sensor tasking include but are not limited to: executing surface-, volume-, or sector-specific search patterns; modifying or updating search modes; applying track-based controls; cueing other sensors on a specific target; or other actions. Example algorithmic techniques and fields from which approaches could be derived include stochastic and Bayesian optimization, metaheuristics, model predictive control theory, or others. Proposals using artificial intelligence and machine learning approaches will also be considered, but proposers should note that candidate solutions must be capable of generating resource re-allocation recommendations in scenarios that may be completely novel to the combat system and for which little to no prior exposure has been provided. Finally, proposed solutions should correspond to and be compatible with the existing SSDS Program of Record sensors. The initial solution will focus on mathematical and algorithmic development needed to address interactions between four radars that either are or will be installed on most SSDS platforms: SPS-48, SPQ-9B, MK-9 Tracker/Illuminator, and SPY-6(V)3. Solutions should be demonstrable under low to medium-fidelity modeling and simulation approaches, and the algorithmic solutions included in the proposed solution must be explainable. Five SSDS Top Level Requirements (TLRs) would be supported by this investigation (note that, in the requirements language below, EW signifies Electronic Warfare, and ES signifies Electronic Support): • The SSDS Combat System (CS) shall provide a sensor cueing capability that automatically selects and assigns air tracks to specified own ship sensors for the purpose of achieving requisite track confidence and track data quality to support automatic engagement recommendations at maximum range allowed by engagement doctrine. [SSDS_CS_TLR-289] • The SSDS CS shall perform cued radar search for high-priority ES tracks that meet specified criteria but are not correlated or associated with existing SSDS CS active radar tracks. [SSDS_CS_TLR-291] • The SSDS CS shall detect resource utilization conflicts between sensors and resolve them based on the sensor resource priorities established. [SSDS_CS_TLR-1300] • The SSDS CS shall have automated and manual capabilities to request additional target EW data by ES sensor(s) for a specified track to support updates to EW classification. [SSDS_CS_TLR-1607] • The SSDS CS shall coordinate above water radar activities based on radar capabilities, availability, and tactical and operational conditions. [SSDS_CS_TLR-1631] Solutions explored during a potential Phase II award must include an expanded set of sensors, the last of which is an ES sensor. The full sensor suite will therefore include SPS-48, SPS-49, SPQ-9B, SPY-6(V)2, SPY-6(V)3, MK-9 Tracker/Illuminator, and SLQ-32(V)6. Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. owned and operated with no foreign influence as defined by 32 U.S.C. § 2004.20 et seq., National Industrial Security Program Executive Agent and Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) formerly Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances. This will allow contractor personnel to perform on advanced phases of this project as set forth by DCSA and NAVSEA in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material during the advanced phases of this contract IAW the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), which can be found at Title 32, Part 2004.20 of the Code of Federal Regulations.