Military Global Positioning System User Equipment (MGUE) Multiple-Global Navigation Satellite System (Multi-GNSS) Capability Request for Information

Introduction Multiple-Global Navigation Satellite System (Multi-GNSS) is the use of more than one unique satellite navigation constellation to produce a user's Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) solution. GPS is currently the only approved source of satellite-based PNT for military use. The Government is investigating the use of additional GNSS signals to provide robustness and resiliency for military PNT users. The purpose of this RFI is to solicit industry for capabilities and possible impacts of implementing Multi-GNSS as part of the military's PNT receiver solution. Results and information gathered may be used to support a future MGUE acquisition strategy. The following policy, benefits and use cases are a few of the influences for Multi-GNSS implementation: Policy 1. National Space Policy of the United States of America, 2010: "Foreign positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services may be used to augment and strengthen the resiliency of GPS." "Departments and agencies ... shall ... promote appropriate cost-and risk-sharing among participating nations in international partnerships; and augment U.S. capabilities by leveraging existing and planned space capabilities of allies and space partners." 2. National Security Space Strategy Unclassified Summary, 2011: "We will seek to expand mutually beneficial agreements with key partners to utilize existing and planned capabilities that can augment U.S. National Security Space capabilities. We will promote appropriate cost-sharing and risk-sharing partnerships to develop and share capabilities." 3. Department of Defense Directive on Space Policy Number 3100.10, 2012: "Alternate means of accomplishing the mission may include ... leveraging allied, foreign, and commercial space and non-space capabilities." 4. CJCS Master Positioning, Navigation, Timing Plan, CJCSI 6130.01F, 2016: "In no case shall a U.S. military system (or system supporting U.S. military operations) rely solely on civil or foreign systems (without appropriate waiver), but may use them to augment PPS performance when appropriate measures are taken to provide information assurance for PNT." 5. FY17 NDAA, Sec. 1608. Prohibition on Use of Certain Non-allied Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Systems: "...the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the Armed Forces and each element of the Department of Defense do not use a non-allied positioning, navigation, and timing system or service provided by such a system." The term non-allied positioning, navigation, and timing system'' means any of the following systems: The BeiDou system [and] The GLONASS global navigation satellite system." 6. FY18 NDAA, Sec. 1607. Enhancement of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capacity: The Secretary of Defense "shall develop a plan to increase the positioning, navigation, and timing capacity of the Department of Defense...[and] ensure that military Global Positioning System user equipment terminals have the capability, including with appropriate mitigation efforts, to receive trusted signals from the Galileo satellites of the European Union and the QZSS satellites of Japan, beginning with increment 2 of the acquisition of such terminals." Benefits 1. System diversity: the ability to use satellite navigation even when GPS is not providing a sufficient and/or a useful number of signals. 2. National diversity: the ability to use non-GPS satellite-based PNT signals from other countries' systems. 3. Geometric diversity: the ability to use more independent, angular measurements to improve accuracy and availability particularly when receivers have limited sky view. 4. Frequency diversity: the ability to use non-GPS signals at different carrier frequencies, improving measurement accuracy and helping to overcome different types of natural and manmade threats. 5. Information diversity: the ability to use non-GPS measurements and data from different signals, allowing crosschecking of information and rejection of erroneous information. Possible Multi-GNSS Use Cases Use Case 1 a) Problem: GPS satellite Geometric Dilution of Precision (GDOP) is insufficient or intermittent. Tactical units operating or traveling between Bagram Air Base and Kabul, Afghanistan experience GPS performance degradations due to signal blockage caused by mountains, foliage, and, in Kabul, urban buildings. b) Initial Conditions: The Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) receiver is keyed and has successfully acquired one or more M-Code signals, all GPS Space Vehicles (SVs) are set healthy. The MGUE receiver knows its approximate position and has stored almanac for available Multi-GNSS by use of background tracking or external update via MGUE receiver data port. The MGUE receiver references an internally stored signal precedence list to determine the precedence of signals/systems it may access. c) MGUE Receiver Response: The MGUE receiver shall attempt to acquire and track Multi-GNSS signals in any user designated order of precedence and fuse the combination of measurements for a PNT solution. The MGUE receiver shall provide accuracy and quality metrics for the Multi-GNSS signals and fused PNT solution as good as or better than the performance of those provided in "GPS-Only" mode. Use Case 2: a) Problem: A bad navigation upload from the Control Segment, or a systemic GPS anomaly affecting multiple GPS signals from multiple GPS satellites. b) Initial Conditions: GPS signals are visible, but may have various anomalies that render some of them inaccurate or unreliable. The MGUE receiver is keyed and has successfully acquired one or more M-Code signals. The MGUE receiver knows its approximate position, and the MGUE receiver has stored almanac for available Multi-GNSS by use of background tracking of Multi-GNSS or external update via MGUE receiver data ports. The MGUE receiver references an internally stored signal precedence list to determine the precedence of signals/systems it may access. c) MGUE Receiver Response: The MGUE receiver shall remove the bad signals and attempt to acquire and track GNSS signals in any user-designated order of precedence and fuse the combination of signal measurements for an improved PNT solution. The MGUE receiver shall provide accuracy and quality metrics for the Multi-GNSS signals and PNT solution as good as or better than the performance of those provided for "GPS-Only" mode. Use Case 3: a) Problem: The GPS Master Control Station is dealing with an anomaly and has completely shut down its operations. The MGUE receiver has determined that the current accuracy of GPS signals is insufficient to perform the user's mission. b) Initial Conditions: The MGUE receiver is keyed. GPS signals are not available for use or are too inaccurate for use. MGUE Receivers have stored almanac for available Multi-GNSS by use of background tracking of Multi-GNSS or external update via MGUE receiver data ports. c) MGUE Receiver Response: The MGUE receiver recognizes absence or degradation of usable GPS signals. The MGUE receiver shall attempt to acquire and track Multi-GNSS signals in any user designated order of precedence and fuse the combination of signal measurements for a PNT solution. Potential GPS and Non-GPS Signals 1. Military Used Signals: a. Encrypted GPS: L1 M-Code, L2 M-Code b. Encrypted GPS: L1 Y-Code, L2 Y-Code c. Unencrypted GPS: L1 P-Code, L2 P-Code d. Unencrypted GPS: L1 C/A-Code 2. Non-Military Used Signals: a. Unencrypted GPS: L1C, L2C, L5 b. Galileo: E1OS, E5a c. Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS): L1C, L2C, L5 d. Space Based Augmentation System (SBAS): L1, L5 Statement of Capability Interested respondents should provide a Statement of Capability (SOC) that describes a strategy and approach to designing and developing a Multi-GNSS receiver. Interested companies need to address the following questions in the next section: 1. Describe solutions in the context of your assumed concept of operations including, but not limited to, the feedback between the Ground Stations, Space Vehicles, and User Equipment. Concept of Operations assumptions may be presented in the form of a description, diagram, picture, or a combination of multiple forms. 2. Broadcast integrity messages provide the user information on the quality of service for GNSS signals. Discuss how broadcast integrity messages (on any signal) could be best applied to improve the assurance of open GNSS signals. 3. Given the various threats or errors that might be encountered in using open signals from foreign satellite navigation systems, how will your design evaluate and report the level of trust or assurance in the Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) solution that it outputs? What would be the recommended approach for handling security and measurement processing? Describe the PNT assurance approach. How and when will the receiver know to switch to Multi-GNSS? 4. Describe proposed techniques that can be applied to detect, report, and mitigate jamming and spoofing of open GNSS signals. 5. What specific Multi-GNSS signal or signals are recommended as the primary backup to GPS and what is rationale? What other options should be considered for evaluation? 6. Which potential combinations of Multi-GNSS signals are recommended to improve PNT availability and why? (e.g., urban canyons) 7. Describe your proposed signal acquisition order of precedence. 8. Describe the evaluation criteria that you recommend for selecting both individual and combinations of Multi-GNSS signals. 9. How can other aiding sources (e.g., pseudolites) affect the use of the proposed Multi-GNSS solution? 10. For the broadest classes of military users, what would be the minimum, most cost-effective Multi-GNSS solution that would also provide substantial operational benefit? Provide a budget planning level year-by-year cost and schedule estimate. 11. Provide an overall risk assessment for the proposed Multi-GNSS design, with possible risk mitigations. RFI Responses: This notice does not constitute a Request for Proposal (RFP). There has been no decision to develop an RFP for the effort in this RFI. Information herein is based on the best information available at the time of publication, is subject to revision, and is not binding on the Government. The Government will not recognize any costs associated with the production and submission of the RFI response. Interested responsible sources should submit their responses by 1700 Pacific Time on 22 January 2018 (46 days after release). Responses shall be 8.5" x 11" pages with 1" margins, and 12-point font (Arial or Times New Roman). Pages must be numbered and documents submitted electronically as Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat. The information provided may or may not result in further action. The Government does not intend to award a contract on the basis of this information or otherwise pay for the information requested. The RFI response will be evaluated solely for the purpose of refining the Government's understanding described above and to refine the Government's acquisition approach. Consequently, the Government is primarily interested in responsible sources providing information indicating how that source can meet the Government's needs. Oral communications are not acceptable in response to this notice. Responses from small business and small, disadvantaged business firms are highly encouraged. A responding firm should indicate if it is a small business, a socially and economically disadvantaged business, an 8(a) firm, a historically black college or university, or a minority institution. A determination of whether there are sufficient sources within industry to go forward with recommendations to conduct a restricted acquisition based upon responses to this notice is solely within the discretion of the Government. Submit RFI responses electronically to the Contract Specialist, Dominicke Ybarra at (310) 653-2499, 483 N. Aviation Blvd, Los Angeles AFB, El Segundo, CA 90245-2808. The Air Force has entered into contracts with Booz Allen Hamilton, Canyon Consulting, Stellar Solutions, MITRE Corporation, Tecolote Research, Engility, Lokahi, and the Aerospace Corporation. These companies support the Air Force program office. Respondents are hereby notified that all responses will be provided to the Government's support contractors for their services to the U.S. Air Force. If a respondent does not wish to have any of those companies review its response, or requires those companies to enter into a non-disclosure agreement with it prior to SMC/GP releasing that response to those companies, the respondent shall clearly state. An ombudsman has been appointed to hear and facilitate the resolution of concerns from offerors, potential offerors, and others for this acquisition. When requested, the ombudsman will maintain strict confidentiality as to the source of the concern. The existence of the ombudsman does not affect the authority of the program manager, Contracting Officer, or source selection official. Further, the ombudsman does not participate in the evaluation of proposals, the source selection process, or the adjudication of protests or formal contract disputes. The ombudsman may refer the interested party to another official who can resolve the concern. Before consulting with an ombudsman, interested parties must first address their concerns, issues, disagreements, or recommendations to the Contracting Officer for resolution. Consulting an ombudsman does not alter or postpone the timelines for any other processes. If resolution cannot be made by the Contracting Officer, the interested party may contact the ombudsman, Mr. James Tisdale, SMC/PKX, James.Tisdale.4@us.af.mil, 483 N. Aviation Blvd, Los Angeles AFB, El Segundo, CA 90245-2808. The ombudsman has no authority to render a decision that binds the agency. Do not contact the ombudsman to request copies of information, verify due date, or clarify technical requirements. Such inquiries shall be directed to the Contracting Officer.