ACC-AMIC-RFI-Independent_Research_and_Development_2019

Begin Attachment "Tab-1" ------------------------------------------- ---UPDTE 20190108 Solicitation Number: ACC-AMIC-RFI-Independent_Research_and_Development Notice Type: Modification/Amendment Synopsis: Added: Dec 14, 2015 12:28 pm Modified: Jan 8, 2019 Notice Type: Special Notice Synopsis: 2019 ACC TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION EXCHANGE (TIE) EVENTS Headquarters Air Combat Command (HQ ACC) senior leaders seek discussions with industry, academia, and other government organizations to explore emerging technologies with potential applications to combat airpower. While not a request for contractual offers or proposals, these Technical Information Exchange (TIE) discussions may offer organizations currently conducting Independent Research & Development (IR&D) activities the opportunity to exchange insights with Air Force senior leaders and better focus organizational efforts toward Air Force air combat needs in a mutually beneficial manner. The intent of a TIE event is to focus senior-level discussions on IR&D projects or efforts that may prove useful in the employment of combat airpower while also affording participants the opportunity to gain a fuller understanding of the combat air forces' near-, mid-, and far-term capability needs. Successful TIEs generate and sustain an ongoing dialogue on emerging technologies relevant to the ACC core functions between ACC leaders and senior-level participants from industry, academia, FFRDCs, intra-governmental organizations and others. TIEs also provide preliminary opportunities for information exchanges in science, technology and innovation on the participant's current projects that may have the potential to bring advanced capability to warfighters. A general officer or civilian equivalent from the Directorate of Plans, Programs and Requirements (ACC/A5/8/9) will host each TIE session. ACC is the primary provider of air combat forces to America's warfighting commanders and the directorate champions the capability needs for six of the twelve Air Force Core Functions: Air Superiority (AS); Command and Control (C2); Cyberspace Superiority (Cyber); Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (GIISR); Global Precision Attack (GPA); and Personnel Recovery (PR). For reference, the command's capability needs by core function are available on the Defense Technical Information Center SIPR website here: https://reg.dtic.smil.mil/SDTICreg Note: To access these documents, users must have an active SIPR account and access them through Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). In accordance with AFH 31-602, Industrial Security Program. For DTIC assistances please use the following information: email dtic.belvoir.us.mbx.dtic-access@mail.mil or telephone DTIC's Customer Access Team at: 1-800-225-3842 (Menu Selection 2) or (703) 767-8273 or DSN 427-8273. HQ ACC cannot assist organizations or individuals in obtaining SIPR DTIC access or provide an alternative means to access these documents. In addition, a supplemental list of topics interest to ACC is available as an attachment to this call. If you have question to any of the topics please send an e-mail to acca8xs@us.af.mil and acc.a5.8xx@us.af.mil for further assistances. ====================================================== NEW THIS YEAR We are exploring new ways to make TIE event more fruitful for all participants. We would like to provide an opportunity to provide feedbacks prior to a scheduled TIE event. By doing so, we hope to achieve a more focused discussion at the event. In order to support this plan, we have made the following changes to this FBO call. 1. Shorter nomination period. a. FBO call is only open for few weeks b. If you have a topic that is ready, send it to us and we will review it 2. Faster response: All nominated topics will receive a response a. A reason will be provided for topics not selected b. A draft read-ahead will be requested to further support down selection process (Note* quick turn-around from industry ~2 weeks) 3. Topics selected after the read-ahead process will get invited to TIE event a. A reason will be provided for topics not selected ====================================================== If you are interested in participating in a TIE event with ACC, please e-mail the following items to acca8xs@us.af.mil and acc.a5.8xx@us.af.mil no later than the closing date of this announcement: (1) (Use Arial Font 10-12, not to exceed five pages per company) Brief description/ abstract of the IR&D topic(s) you would like to nominate. For each nominated abstract, please also include which core function area(s) the abstract is intended for (ie: AS, C2, Cyber, GIISR, GPA, and/or PR.) There is no limit on the number of abstracts nominated, however a total of 5 pages are allowed per company. (2) Point(s) of contact information for further coordination if selected. Recommend one or two POCs per company. (3) (New Process - Faster and more responsive) ACC TIE Topic Down Selection Process - Tentative Schedule ACC TIE Topic Selection Process - Tentative Schedule Industry response to FBO Call R1 (~ January 2019) ACC response back to Industry R2 = R1 + (1 ~ 2 weeks) Industry response to ACC - Draft Presentation R3 = R2 + (1 ~ 2 Weeks) ACC finalize topics and notify Industry R4 = R3+ (1-~ 2 Weeks) Responses are DUE by COB Eastern on 25 January 2019. HQ ACC will review nominated IR&D topics and provide feedback to (nominator/industry POC). ACC SMEs will make a request for draft read-ahead for topics they would like to learn more. These drafts should be send back to ACC NLT two weeks from the request date. If required, more feedback will be provided back to (nominator/industry POC), else an invitation will be send. This will further help shape a more focused ACC TIE event and to ensure that companies invited provides key IR&D initiatives that have the greatest potential to address the command's capability needs. Invitees should prepare senior representatives to present ongoing IR&D technology efforts to HQ ACC senior leaders, explain how these efforts could address warfighting capability needs across any of the command's six core functions, and discuss potential implementation strategies. All deliverables will become property of the US Government, whether or not participants are selected to participate in the TIE events. As always, ACC is committed to safeguarding corporate proprietary information and intellectual property in accordance with FAR 3.104 and other regulations. This announcement is a Request for Information (RFI) in accordance with FAR 15.201 (b). THIS IS NOT A SOLICITATION. This notice is not a request for contractual offers. RFIs gather information from participants without any promise of a current or future contract or requirement. Information provided does not create a binding contract. There is no reimbursement to the RFI respondents for the information provided to HQ ACC. This announcement is a request for information from companies currently conducting IR&D in relevant areas, not a request for companies that may be able to conduct research. Only those companies with demonstrated success in addressing Department of Defense capability development in their IR&D programs should consider responding to this RFI. To be clear, invited organizations participating in TIEs do not receive any financial reimbursement from ACC or the Air Force. Contracting Office Address: 129 Andrews St., Ste. 110 Joint Base Langley Eustis, VA 23665 United States Primary Point of Contact for Contracting: Andrew Nault andrew.nault.1@us.af.mil Phone: 7577649084 Secondary Point of Contact for Contracting: Christin L. Lockhart, Contracting Officer christin.lockhart@us.af.mil Phone: 7577649154 Primary Point of Contact for TIE event: ACC's Science and Technology Branch (ACC/(A5/8XS)) at DSN: 574-7704 Commercial: 757-764-7704 or email, acca8xs@us.af.mil and acc.a5.8xx@us.af.mil Place of Performance: HQ ACC/(A5/8XS) Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia 23665 United States --------------------------------------- End Attachment "Tab-1" Begin Attachment "Tab-2" ------------------------------------------- Examples: (1) "SmallSats for Environmental Intelligence, Resilience, and Communications" "A space-based environmental modeling (SBEM) analysis of alternatives (AoA-conducted in 2013) identified 12 prioritized capability gaps. These gaps were further validated by multiple Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandums (JROCMs) in 2016. There is a compelling need to improve data collection, ingest, and prediction to accurately characterize the environment to meet planning and combat needs. It is believed SmallSats (or CubeSats) could be used to address some of the gaps as an alternative to traditional large satellites with constellations of SmallSats affordably enabling an expansion in coverage. In addition to improved environmental intelligence, SmallSats could add resiliency, improve airborne radio relay, communications and networking, and better enable low-data rate transmission. The objective of this topic is to demonstrate some or all of these capabilities." "SmallSat, cubeSat, remote sensing, constellation, resiliency, communication, weather" (2) Secure Tactical Comm Capability "In order to successfully realize the austere basing concept described in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), a secure tactical communications capability must be developed. In particular, improvements should be made to enable secure transmission of large data through limited communication channels. What is desired is improved lossless data compression and demonstration of secure large data transfer in an austere environment." "Austere basing, data compression, secure communication, resiliency" (3) Ionospheric Characterization System "There is a need to assess and predict the likelihood SATCOM and satellite C2 links, GPS-aided systems, and radar systems were, are, or will be impacted as a result of natural environmental causes (e.g., ionospheric scintillation, solar radio emissions, electro-magnetic interference, etc.). The system should provide near real-time and retrospective assessments and provide the magnitude of impact and confidence level for incorporation into an overall spectrum common operating picture. This effort should also aim to improve current space physics environmental monitoring systems as well as physics-based predictive models. The effort could include a small-size, weight, and power (SWAP) operational space-based environment sensor technology to aid characterization of the energetic charge particle environment as well as advanced space-based ionospheric sensors." "Ionosphere, scintillation, GPS, navigation, space physics, space situational awareness (SSA)" (4) Enhanced Air Domain Awareness in Highly Contested Environment (HCE) "Enhanced cross domain data fusion to find, fix and track air targets in a HCE to maximize air domain awareness across multiple platforms and BMC2 nodes. " Battlespace Awareness; Battlespace Characterization; Data Fusion; Visualization (5) Weapons employment network Network concepts to employ collaborative weapons effects "Secure datalink, collaborative behaviors, battle damage assessment, artificial intelligence, retargeting, swarming, kinetic attack, non-kinetic effects" (6) Kinetic effects in munitions "Advanced energetics or effects from smaller, kinetic weapons payloads " "Blast, scalable, insensitive, thermal stability, high explosive yield" (7) Non-Kinetic Effects (NKE) in munitions Complimentary effects and impacts of NKE across the kill chain (F2T2EA). "Spectrum management, Directed Energy (DE), high power jamming, network and hardware disruption, A2AD, multi-domain, cyber effects" (8) Rapid Intelligence source data and identification Data-mining and distribution of signals and systems used by adversaries during conflict to facilitate rapid identification and system reprogramming "Data-mining, real-time, multi-spectral, Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, predictive, identification, countermeasures, mission data reprogramming" (9) Geo-Spatial Cyberspace Situational Awareness (SA) "The Air Force and other services have a need to fuse air, space, sea, and land situational awareness pictures with the cyberspace domain. Current methods of displaying cyber SA (IP maps, NMAP, among others) do not provide the same level of fidelity, criticality, and accuracy found in current SA pictures in various Command & Control (C2) centers. Also, the cyber information today does not provide a means to quickly fuse with existing fighting domain battlespace information. The cyber SA is in need of a means to relate IP and logical space to geospatial aspects in order to provide accurate Blue/Red SA and to allow the underlying cyberspace information to augment Air and Space displays. This problem is not just limited to the Air Force, but is also of interest to the other military services and other government agencies" "Data Fusion, Geospatial Display, Interoperability, Battle Management C2 (BMC2), Situational Awareness" (10) Industrial Control System (ICS) Cyber Security "Digital control systems are pervasive within the AF, and the numbers are growing daily. Interconnectivity to improve operational efficiency has opened the door to additional cyber threats, and examples of system failures due to cyber compromise are plentiful within industry. Restrictive procurement practices within DOD have resulted in the acquisition of a vast number of systems from many vendors without any provision being made by the AF to maintain the sustainment tail. Consequently, systems in place for up to 20 years have not kept pace with rapidly evolving cyber threats. Creation and defense of ICS network enclaves, separate from corporate networks, with strict configuration management, is common practice in industry. How can the AF approach to control systems (networks, standardized procurement, configuration management, and defense) be revitalized to keep pace with industry best practices?" "ICS, SCADA, Cyber Security, Air Force, DOD, NDAA 1650" (11) Large Network Design "The Air Force and other government agencies have some of the largest networks in the world with the most demanding user service requirements. Our networks are more diversified and complex than commercial networks. This dramatically increases the complexity of troubleshooting, change implementation, service improvement, and general management of network operations. Off-the-shelf architectures for the commercial world don't necessarily translate easily into AF operations. The AF solution today is to contract out the IT services (Enterprise IT As a Service). If this doesn't work, the AF will need to have a "Plan B." That plan should be to redesign our entire set of network services and implement solutions consistent with IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) principles." "Large Network Design, Cyber Security, ITIL, EITaaS, Air Force, DoD" (12) Deploying "Just-In-Time" technology/software in a large Enterprise environment. "What is an effective way to rapidly deploy a new technology in a large environment? When there are many sub-organizations that need training on the new technology, licensing, and hardware, how should it be distributed in a way that every needed organization is prepared without sacrificing time? How should this be done when organizations from multiple tiers need to use this technology (base-level, Enterprise-level, gateway-level)?" "Large-Scale Distribution, New Technology" (13) Balancing a high level of cyberspace security with end-user experience. "Industries must have a high level of user-friendliness and security in order to maintain their customers. An example of this is that USAA must have an extremely low number of security incidents (people are trusting USAA with their money and information) and be user-friendly (no one wants to use a product that's difficult to navigate, doesn't have an iPhone app, etc.). If USAA can't meet both of those standards, they won't have people's business. So how can the AF better balance a high level of cyberspace security with a better end-user experience?" "Security, User-Friendliness, Technology" (14) Automated Security / Comply-to-Connect "Minimize or eliminate the man-in-the-loop for security endpoints on the enterprise. How do we enable PEO/PMO system owners to accomplish this same action using the enterprise tools already deployed on the enterprise? What can be accomplished with the existing tools/capabilities? What new modules for existing tools would accomplish this situational awareness to minimize adding tools to the network? If a new tool is required on the network, what existing tools could be removed based on the new tool's overlap with existing tools? This need requires a matrix of executable options ranging from automated steady-state remediation through levels of restricted access based on (1) criticality of the vulnerability, (2) threat/intent of adversary, and (3) mission criticality of the affected system. Concept of Operation should include a seamless transition from securing actions to defending actions either within the same tools or through commercial integration between tools. This seamless transition must include comply-to-connect and automated DCO leveraging the same quarantine and network security options. This topic is directly linked to 561 NOS topic submission. "Balancing a high-level of cyberspace security with end-user experience"." "Cyber Security, Artificial Intelligence, Cyberspace, Intelligence " (15) Mapping the Network / Blue Force Tracking "How do we minimize or eliminate the man-in-the-loop for mapping systems on the enterprise and the applications on these systems to include all PEO/PMO systems? What can be accomplished with the existing tools/capabilities? What new modules for existing tools would accomplish this situational awareness to minimize adding tools to the network? If a new tool is required on the network, what existing tools could be removed based on the new tool's overlap with existing tools? The operational need requires near-real-time discovery and presentation of information to support missions during execution and current situational awareness for planning, securing, and defending blue (and grey when allowed) space." "Situational Awareness, Asset Control/Management, Mapping, Whitelisting, Cyber Security, Cyberspace " (17) Trusted Platform Industry must show the ability to isolate the vulnerability of the client endpoints from user access to unsecure connections/environments. Any capability must seamless work with SDC and be transparent to the user while allowing DCO tools and missions to execute. Operational employment must enforce DLP operations. "Situational Awareness, Asset Control/Management, Mapping, Whitelisting, Cyber Security" (18) Integrated/Correlated network and endpoint defensive capabilities "Provide a seamless operational transition between existing network based defenses and endpoint defenses where the automated communication between existing tools (Palo Alto, Tanium, Fidelis, CISCO, etc.) minimize the human need to synthesize information between defensive tools and allow the operator to focus on the adversary behavior on and between endpoints across the enterprise." "Cyber Defense, Cyber Security, Cyberspace " (19) Data Analytics / Data Warehouse "Provide single data source where multiple sensor feeds are correlated and fused upon which any data analytics tool can enable trend analysis, asset understanding, and mission planning. Discussions must clearly delineate the difference between tactical, operational, and strategic data analytics. Consider artificial intelligence abilities to shape analytics and minimize operators "sifting" through vast amounts of information." "Big Data, Data Analytics, Mission Planning, Cyber Defense, Cyber Security, Cyberspace " ------------------------------------------- End Attachment "Tab-2"