Electro-Optical/Infrared Tactical Decision Aid

The United States Navy (USN) requires the capability to rapidly predict the performance of sensors that depend on the propagation of electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) radiation (i.e., wavelengths from 0.4 to 12 micron) in air. Sensor performance is subject to environmental/meteorologic conditions, as well as sensor, platform, background/clutter, and target characteristics. For a given sensor on a platform and a target in background/clutter, a forecaster should be able to determine key performance metrics; for example, maximum detection range based on the forecasted meteorological conditions. In this way, USN commanders can make tactical decisions based on the predicted sensor performance given ambient/forecast weather conditions. Key modeling components within a TDA include the land/maritime surface background, target signature, radiative transfer, and sensor performance models. These models are often interdependent, requiring feedback between them (e.g., radiative transfer between target and background models is needed to compute the contrast of the target in the background, which then feeds into a sensor performance model). Target Acquisition Weapons Software (TAWS), a successor to Electro-Optic Tactical Decision Aid (EOTDA), was originally developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and released in 1998. Later a target scene model improvement for selected high-resolution targets was implemented with Multi-Service Electro-optics Signature (MuSES). The USN is looking for an innovative and accurate EO/IR TDA, which would be an alternative/improvement to TAWS. Improvements could include support for three dimensional meteorological inputs. The primary challenge for implementing an EO/IR TDA is the methodical verification and validation (V&V) of the constituent models and submodels being developed. This SBIR topic seeks innovative solutions to the development of an EO/IR TDA with particular focus on the methods proposed to verify and validate developed models. A list of prior V&V efforts on proposed submodels should be made clear in the responses to this solicitation, as well as the proposed means/methods to conduct V&V under a Phase II and/or Phase III. Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. owned and operated with no foreign influence as defined by 32 U.S.C. § 2004.20 et seq., National Industrial Security Program Executive Agent and Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) formerly Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor and/or subcontractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances. This will allow contractor personnel to perform on advanced phases of this project as set forth by DCSA and ONR in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material during the advanced phases of this contract IAW the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), which can be found at Title 32, Part 2004.20 of the Code of Federal Regulations.